87 research outputs found
Karma Theory, Determinism, Fatalism and Freedom of Will
The so-called theory of karma is one of the distinguishing aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. At the same time that the theory can be seen as closely connected with the freedom of will and action that we humans supposedly have, it has many times been said to be determinist and fatalist. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in some deepness the relations that are between the theory of karma on one side and determinism, fatalism and free-will on the other side. In order to do that, I shall use what has been described as the best formal approach we have to indeterminism: branching time theory. More specifically, I shall introduce a branching time semantic framework in which, among other things, statements such as âstate of affairs e is a karmic effect of agent aâ, âa wills it to be the case that eâ and âe is inevitableâ could be properly represented
Logic and the Concept of God
This paper introduces the special issue on the Concept of God of the Journal of Applied Logics (College Publications). The issue contains the following articles: Logic and the Concept of God, by StanisĆaw Krajewski and Ricardo Silvestre; Mathematical Models in Theology. A Buber-inspired Model of God and its Application to âShema Israelâ, by StanisĆaw Krajewski; Gödelâs God-like Essence, by Talia Leven; A Logical Solution to the Paradox of the Stone, by HĂ©ctor HernĂĄndez Ortiz and Victor Cantero; No New Solutions to the Logical Problem of the Trinity, by Beau Branson; What Means âTri-â in âTrinityâ ? An Eastern Patristic Approach to the âQuasi-Ordinalsâ, by Basil LouriĂ©; The Ăminence Grise of Christology: Porphyryâs Logical Teaching as a Cornerstone of Argumentation in Christological Debates of the Fifth and Sixth Centruies, by Anna Zhyrkova; The Problem of Universals in Late Patristic Theology, by Dirk KrasmĂŒller; Intuitionist Reasoning in the Tri-unitrian Theology of Nicolas of Cues, by Antonino Drago
Paranormal modal logic â Part I. The system K? and the foundations of the logic of skeptical and credulous plausibility
In this two-parts paper we present paranormal modal logic: a modal logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Besides using a general framework in which a wide range of logics including normal modal logics, paranormal modal logics and classical logic can be defined and proving some key theorems about paranormal modal logic (including that it is inferentially equivalent to classical normal modal logic), we also provide a philosophical justification for the view that paranormal modal logic is a formalization of the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility
Paranormal modal logic â Part II: K?, K and Classical Logic and other paranormal modal systems
In this two-part paper we present paranormal modal logic: a modal logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Besides using a general framework in which a wide range of logics â including normal modal logics, paranormal modal logics and classical logic â can be defined and proving some key theorems about paranormal modal logic (including that it is inferentially equivalent to classical normal modal logic), we also provide a philosophical justification for the view that paranormal modal logic is a formalization of the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility
A Formal-Logical Approach to the Concept of God
In this paper I try to answer four basic questions: (1) How the concept of God is to be represented? (2) Are there any logical principles governing it? (3) If so, what kind of logic lies behind them? (4) Can there be a logic of the concept of God? I address them by presenting a formal-logical account to the concept of God. I take it as a methodological desideratum that this should be done within the simplest existing logical formalism. I start with first-order logic (FOL) with identity, and then show that its simplest modal extension (SQML, or the simplest quantified modal logic) is enough for us to formalize a minimally satisfactory theory of the concept of God. I focus exclusively on the monotheistic concept of God
The classical theory of concepts and the concept of god
Ao mesmo tempo que o malogro da assim chamada teoria claÌssica dos conceitos â de acordo com a qual definiçoÌes saÌo a maneira apropriada de caracterizar conceitos â eÌ um consenso, a filosofia metafiÌsica da religiaÌo parece ainda lidar com o conceito de Deus de forma predominantemente definicional. Podemos entaÌo nos perguntar: Seria esse malogro suficiente para inviabilizar uma caracterizaçaÌo definicional do conceito de Deus? Meu propoÌsito central neste artigo eÌ responder essa pergunta. Adoto uma eÌnfase representacional. Em outras palavras, desejo analisar ateÌ que ponto os problemas mais importantes levantados contra a teoria claÌssica dos conceitos afetam uma abordagem definicional-representacional do conceito de Deus. Como resultado desse esforço, mostro que as criÌticas aÌ teoria claÌssica que ameaçam tal abordagem dependem da pluralidade caracteriÌstica ao contexto inter-religioso, que por si soÌ cria outros problemas.
Palavras-chave: Teoria claÌssica dos conceitos, conceito de Deus, pluralidade do conceito de Deus.While the failure of the so-called classical theory of concepts â according to which definitions are the proper way to characterize concepts â is a consensus, metaphysical philosophy of religion still deals with the concept of God in a predominantly definitional manner. We can then ask: Do this failure imply that a definitional characterization of the concept of God is equally untenable? My central purpose in this article is to answer that question. My emphasis is representational. I plan to analyze the extent to which the most important problems raised against the classical theory of concepts affect a definitional-representational approach to the concept of God. As a result of this effort, I show that the criticisms against the classical theory that threaten such an approach depend on the plurality characteristic of the interreligious context, which in its turn creates other problems.
Keywords: Classical theory of concepts, concept of God, plurality of the concept of God
Um Curso de LĂłgica
Este livro se propĂ”e a ser uma introdução fĂĄcil e acessĂvel, porĂ©m rigorosa e tecnicamente precisa, Ă lĂłgica. Prioridade Ă© dada Ă clareza e lucidez na explicação das definiçÔes e teoremas, bem como Ă aplicação prĂĄtica da lĂłgica na anĂĄlise de argumentos. O livro foi concebido de forma a permitir sua utilização por qualquer pessoa interessada em aprender lĂłgica, independentemente de sua ĂĄrea de atuação ou bagagem teĂłrica prĂ©via. Em especial, ele deve ser Ăștil a estudantes e professores de filosofia, computação e matemĂĄtica
Paraconsistent Logic as Model Building
The terms âmodelâ and âmodel-buildingâ have been used to characterize the field of formal philosophy, to evaluate philosophyâs and philosophical logicâs progress and to define philosophical logic itself. A model is an idealization, in the sense of being a deliberate simplification of something relatively complex in which several important aspects are left aside, but also in the sense of being a view too perfect or excellent, not found in reality, of this thing. Paraconsistent logic is a branch of philosophical logic. It is however not clear how paraconsistent logic can be seen as model-building. What exactly is modeled? In this paper I adopt the perspective of looking at a particular instance of paraconsistent logicâparanormal modal logicâwhich might be seen as a model of a specific kind of agent: inductive agents. After
ntroducing what I call the highlevel and low-level models of inductive agents, I analyze the extent to
which the above-mentioned idealizing features of model-building appear in paranormal modal logic and how they affect its philosophical significance
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